Since a contribution does not only have to be truthful but also interesting and of interest, criticisms can be directed at all three dimensions. When you want to be critical of a particular conversation, say, Marxist or neoclassical, you could try to argue that its claims are false. Capitalism works and the rate of profit is not falling, you could posit to discredit Marxist economics. Or you could point at crises in capitalist systems to undermine neoclassical economics. Don't expect your opponents to surrender. However truthful your claims are, truth is not all that matters.
Instead of exposing the untruth of a conversation or a contribution thereto, you could question its meaningfulness. The contribution may fail to make relevant connections, conflict with important values, or may simply fail to interest you. When I asked Sir John Hicks how he responds to the notion of "conflict," he reacted with irritation and mumbled that he had nothing to do with that (Klamer 1989). In this way, he made clear that a Marxist discourse would not interest him, regardless of its truth-value. Likewise, some people may be uninterested in speaking about humans as if they were computers or about economies as if they were game-theoretic. In the former case, the would-be participant hasn't much interest in the abstract discourse of neural systems; in the latter case, he or she will most likely not find any neoclassical conversation compelling.
Another way of being critical of a conversation or a contribution thereto is to direct your arrows at the interests it serves. Critical friends like Jack Amariglio will point out that I am too nice in this book. Why not speak of powerful and overpowering interests? Why not recognize that some conversations, like the current neoclassical one, overpowers, crowds out and silences other conversations? They want me to hammer home the point that conversations are exclusive in some way or another. To which I say "yes" and "yes" and "but." From the point of view of heterodox economists like institutionalists, Marxists, post-Keynesians, feminist economists, and cultural economists like me, the neoclassical conversation is dominant to the point of overpowering. Its protagonists make sure their interests are served. In 2003, one of the rare bastions of heterodox economics, the University of Notre Dame, isolated itself to make space for a more conventional economics department. But, while all this is going on, the point is that not merely the truth is at stake; neoclassical economists communicate distinct meanings and do well serving their own interests. I do not want to come on so heavily. Neoclassical economists should also be able to be comfortable reading this. That is my interest.
Since a contribution does not only have to be truthful but also interesting and of interest, criticisms can be directed at all three dimensions. When you want to be critical of a particular conversation, say, Marxist or neoclassical, you could try to argue that its claims are false. Capitalism works and the rate of profit is not falling, you could posit to discredit Marxist economics. Or you could point at crises in capitalist systems to undermine neoclassical economics. Don't expect your opponents to surrender. However truthful your claims are, truth is not all that matters.
Instead of exposing the untruth of a conversation or a contribution thereto, you could question its meaningfulness. The contribution may fail to make relevant connections, conflict with important values, or may simply fail to interest you. When I asked Sir John Hicks how he responds to the notion of "conflict," he reacted with irritation and mumbled that he had nothing to do with that (Klamer 1989). In this way, he made clear that a Marxist discourse would not interest him, regardless of its truth-value. Likewise, some people may be uninterested in speaking about humans as if they were computers or about economies as if they were game-theoretic. In the former case, the would-be participant hasn't much interest in the abstract discourse of neural systems; in the latter case, he or she will most likely not find any neoclassical conversation compelling.
Another way of being critical of a conversation or a contribution thereto is to direct your arrows at the interests it serves. Critical friends like Jack Amariglio will point out that I am too nice in this book. Why not speak of powerful and overpowering interests? Why not recognize that some conversations, like the current neoclassical one, overpowers, crowds out and silences other conversations? They want me to hammer home the point that conversations are exclusive in some way or another. To which I say "yes" and "yes" and "but." From the point of view of heterodox economists like institutionalists, Marxists, post-Keynesians, feminist economists, and cultural economists like me, the neoclassical conversation is dominant to the point of overpowering. Its protagonists make sure their interests are served. In 2003, one of the rare bastions of heterodox economics, the University of Notre Dame, isolated itself to make space for a more conventional economics department. But, while all this is going on, the point is that not merely the truth is at stake; neoclassical economists communicate distinct meanings and do well serving their own interests. I do not want to come on so heavily. Neoclassical economists should also be able to be comfortable reading this. That is my interest.